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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890146-CA 
v. : 
ANNE GROSS TAYLOR, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of kidnapping, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 
(Supp. 1989), in the Fourth Judicial District Court. This Court 
has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Did the trial court properly exercise its 
discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial? 
2. Does the prosecution have an obligation to grant 
immunity to a co-charged defendant called as a defense witness? 
3. Was there sufficient evidence adduced at trial to 
sustain defendant's conviction for kidnapping? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable statutes and rules for a determination 
of this case are, in pertinent part* 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-301 (Supp. 1989)t 
(1) A person commits kidnapping when he 
intentionally or knowingly and without 
authority of law and against the will of the 
victims 
(a) Detains or restrains another for 
any substantial period; 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 24x 
(a) The Court may, upon motion of a party 
or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if there is any 
error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Anne Gross Taylor, was charged by 
information with kidnapping, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (Supp. 1989) (R. 80). Defendant was 
convicted after a jury trial held on September 12, 13 and 14, 
1988, in the Fourth Judicial District Court, the Honorable J. 
Robert Bullock, Senior Judge, presiding (R. 298). On September 
20, 1988, defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a 
term not less than one nor more than fifteen years; imposition of 
the sentence was stayed and defendant placed on three years 
unsupervised probation and ordered to pay a five thousand dollar 
($5,000) fine (R, 316-17). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
John Max Taylor and the defendant, Anne Gross Taylor, 
were married on August 7, 1965 (T. 356) At the time of their 
marriage, Mr. Taylor was 57 years old, defendant was 35 (T. 108; 
384). They lived together in New York until July, 1986. 
On July 2, 1986, Mr. Taylor came to Utah to stay with 
his sister, Nadine Ashby, to rest and recuperate from prostate 
surgery (T. 201, 359). Nadine Ashby noticed that upon his 
arrival he appeared "somewhat troubled" (T. 201). Within a few 
days, Mr. Taylor began to mention to his sister that he would 
like to stay in Utah (T. 202). Although defendant had arranged 
for a July 16, 1988, return flight for her husband, Mr. Taylor 
called defendant to inform her he had postponed his return (T. 
359-60). 
Mr. Taylor called defendant frequently and had regular 
correspondence with her through September 1986 (T. 360, R. 123-
57). However, Mr. Taylor did not want to return to New York. 
The letters he sent to defendant represented a "game" and were 
not indicative of his true feelings towards defendant (T. 417-18, 
127) . 
On September 20, 1986, defendant came to Provo to visit 
her husband (T. 169-70). Mr. Taylor and defendant met for 
approximately an hour at Mr. George Mortimer's residence (T. 171, 
173, 364). Mr. Taylor was accompanied by Ned Ashby, Wendell 
Taylor and Susie Gardner, relatives of Mr. Taylor (T. 172, 364). 
The next day, September 21, 1986, defendant hired Mr. 
Mortimer as her attorney to pursue a writ of habeas corpus 
alleging that Mr. Taylor was being held in Utah against his will 
(T. 176-77). 
A day or two later, a second meeting was arranged 
between Mr. Taylor and defendant at the office of Wayne Watson, 
Mr. Taylor's attorney (T. 174-75, 366). At the conclusion of 
that meeting, the habeas corpus complaint was served on Mr. 
Taylor (T. 177). 
The petition for writ of habeas corpus was heard in the 
Fourth Judicial District by Judge Boyd Park (T. 178, 183)- It 
was dismissed with prejudice on the merits (T. 199; Exhibit 14). 
Judge Park found Mr. Taylor was "freely and voluntarily" residing 
in Utah, was "not being held against his will in any fashion" and 
was "competent to make any and all decisions regarding his own 
life", (Exhibit 13, Findings of Fact 1 through 3). 
After the hearing, another meeting between Mr. Taylor 
and defendant was arranged, again at the office of Wayne Watson 
(T. 179, 367). During the meeting, a divorce complaint filed by 
Mr. Taylor was served on defendant's attorney (T. 177-78, 179). 
After Mr. Taylor filed for divorce, defendant 
petitioned to have Mr. Taylor declared incompetent and defendant 
appointed as his guardian (T. 196, 391). The matter was heard 
before Judge George E. Ballif, Fourth Judicial District. It was 
also dismissed with prejudice (T. 196, 391; Exhibit 15). Again, 
the court concluded based on medical and psychological 
examinations of Mr. Taylor that he was "competent and capable of 
making his own independent decisions as to his place of residence 
and all other matters incident to his personal care" (Exhibit 16, 
Conclusions of Law 4). 
Defendant returned to New York at the end of September 
1986. Mr. Taylor remained in Utah (T. 368). 
On February 10, 1987, in connection with the divorce 
proceedings, a restraining order was entered prohibiting the 
defendant from harassing or bothering Mr. Taylor (T. 188, 191). 
The initial divorce complaint was dismissed on July 10, 1987 
because Mr, Taylor ha : t, * >» r-: ^ ""r:u resident fcr nA J 
before fi 1 i ng hi s conn } =* i r - -^v.oi ii^e~ J> second divorce 
complai i it t) le same :: 
Despi te the c • * :u . J ncs, defenddn" * * ' nur>d " ~ 
.f-^ e that Mi Tavl * v-»' 1^- i r • *-**! ^  * m^m;,. i-3^ w« 
r e . r . q p r o p e r l y tree.: . . . : 8 3 , 
410- The p r o b l e n as : * ^ * - , ' h e c o u r t s i d 
rr-* v i ? h t o a c c e p t tii« i a^L LIIOL ^uoiiA l a v l ^ r was xncon ipe i cn t , 
( 
Z effectuate hex rescue" pla., iefendarv contacted a 
pr - ,i v'fi t P i 9 : r-, I I:* -e ::):! 1 Mi 
Taylui • - jd^i ^ . ed 1 name was HeHdori Palmer but he 
identified himself to defendant ac "Carl Evani (T H.\ 404-05, 
4 II I  |l I  III I I  I I I II II II i I I  I I I I I I  III II I III t I II I I I II I f f I I I I  | I I I • t - ' V H I ! I  
nn nit h? 1 "I II11 I 1 
On 1\\}) If l')H ' , d e f e n d a n t accompanied b) RaEldon 
P i 
s i s t e - Nrf : . *- Asnry * j i o c t o r ^ 1 pi . ntn*~ 
AS Mr r "^ - ' - ' i S f P r • * • * * ^rsnfr c r * f I P P tVv ^ O f 
t . r j . ! 
T a y l o i , . Defendant was f - o s e r v - j s h o u t i n g 
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corroborated by witnesses who described him being dragged to and 
forced into the car while he was begging for help (T. 32, 41, 46, 
57-58, 217-18)• Witnesses reported the incident to police and 
provided investigators with the license number of the car (T. 34, 
47). 
Defendant and co-defendant Palmer drove Mr. Taylor to 
Denver where defendant had scheduled a flight to Seattle (T. 339, 
369). After arriving in Denver, defendant and co-defendant 
Palmer learned a kidnapping warrant had been issued and returned 
to Utah (T. 397). Arrangements were made to return Mr. Taylor to 
the police at the office of Richard Johnson, defendant's new 
attorney (T. 68, 290, 293). 
On July 18, 1987, after a preliminary conference at Mr. 
Johnson's office, Mr. Taylor was taken into protective custody 
and admitted to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center for 
examination (T. 69-71). At the hospital, Mr. Taylor demonstrated 
extreme confusion. He could not recognize Dr. Robert Day, his 
personal physician, did not know where he was, and had no short 
term memory (T. 268). Dr. Day, who had seen Mr. Taylor only ten 
days prior to the abduction, first suspected drug intoxication 
(T. 268). A drug screening revealed above normal therapeutic 
levels of valium or diazepam, administered two to eight hours 
prior to the blood sample (T. 244-45, 265). The blood sample had 
been drawn from Mr. Taylor approximately one hour after his 
Mr. RaEldon Palmer was charged with second degree kidnapping, 
the same charge as defendant, but in a separate information. Mr. 
Palmer'8 attorney moved to consolidate the cases. Defendant 
objected. Mr. Palmer's case was therefore set to begin trial at 
the conclusion of defendant's trial (R. 196-97, 213; T. 344-50). 
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wanted to go anywhere with defendant after he filed his divorce 
action (T. 112). Further, he did not go willingly with defendant 
(T. 132). While he could not recall the details of the two day 
abduction (T. 131, 137), he knew defendant and he had argued 
about his going with her. He remembered that defendant and 
another man, MCarlM, had taken him to a desert like country (T. 
135). As he characterized the abduction, "I believe it's obvious 
I didn't want to go. I don't think she asked" (T. 135). 
RaEldon Palmer, like defendant, was charged with 
kidnapping, however his trial was scheduled to begin at the 
conclusion of defendant's. Co-defendant Palmer entered into a 
plea-bargain with the State but had not formally entered a plea 
at the time of defendant's trial. Defendant called co-defendant 
Palmer as a witness (T. 347-48; R. 342-43). On the advice of 
counsel, when called to testify, co-defendant Palmer invoked his 
fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself (T. 350). He 
indicated that but for the advice of counsel he would have been 
willing to testify (T. 351). 
After the jury returned a verdict of guilty, defendant 
moved for a new trial alleging prosecutorial misconduct, claiming 
the State had improperly restricted access to co-defendant 
Palmer's testimony by not finalizing his plea bargain prior to 
defendant's trial or, in the alternative, by not offering co-
defendant Palmer immunity (R. 323-26). The motion was denied (R. 
264). 
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Defendant moved for a new trial alleging prosecutorial 
misconduct in that RaEldon Palmer, a co-defendant charged 
separately from defendant, was not granted immunity so as to 
testify as a defense witness. Specifically, defendant asserts 
that because plea negotiations had been initiated but not 
finalized between the co-defendant and the Utah County Attorney's 
Office, it was prosecutorial misconduct to not complete the plea 
bargain negotiations prior to defendant's trial or, in the 
alternative, to grant the co-defendant immunity (R. 323-326, Br. 
App. 9). Defendant does not argue that there was any impropriety 
in the plea bargain negotiations themselves. Rather, defendant's 
assertion is that the timing of the negotiations obligated the 
prosecution to resolve the matter before defendant's trial or 
offer the co-defendant immunity. 
However, the United States Supreme Court has stated: 
In our criminal justice system, the 
Government retains "broad discretion" as to 
whom to prosecute. . . •_ "[S]o long as the 
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that 
the accused committed an offense defined by 
statute, the decision whether or not to 
prosecute, and what charge to file . . . 
generally rests entirely in his discretion." 
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (citations 
omitted), quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 
(1978). Similarly: 
[[A] prosecutor has no duty] either to plea 
bargain at all or to keep a plea bargain 
offer, once made, open. A defendant has no 
right to engage in plea bargaining in the 
first place. The offer, once made, is still 
in the discretion of the prosecutor. Like 
any offeror, he can withdraw his offer at any 
time, unless, perhaps, the defendant has 
relied on the offer and the prosecutor should 
Ko ftBtnnDed from withdrawing it. 
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Perhaps more to the point, defendant does not even 
contend that immunity was ever requested nor arbitrarily 
withheld. In fact, no immunity was requested (Supp. T. 15). 
Defendant simply asserts that the prosecutor was obligated on its 
own initiative to grant immunity to the co-defendant whose case 
was not yet resolved because another prosecutor had offered the 
2 
co-defendant a plea bargain (Br. App. 13; Supp. T. 2-7). 
Further, despite knowledge of the plea negotiations, 
defendant sought no pretrial remedy to secure Palmer's testimony 
such as a continuance until after Palmer had plead or otherwise 
disposed of his case. State v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P.2d 167 
(Utah 1931); State v. Gehring, 694 P.2d 599 (Utah 1984). In 
deed, defendant did the opposite. During the fifteen months 
prior to trial, defendant received numerous continuances for 
other reasons, while aware that Palmer's case was being continued 
at the same time (Supp. T. 12-13). When co-defendant Palmer's 
attorney sought consolidation of tti.e cases, the State agreed but 
defendant objected (R. 196-97, 213). 
Prior to trial, in compliance with discovery, the State 
had supplied defendant with a two hour audio tape interview of 
co-defendant Palmer by law enforcement (T. 347; Supp. T. 18). 
Yet, defendant did not attempt to introduce any of Palmer's prior 
presumptively voluntary statements to law enforcement. Utah 
Defendant's accusation of prosecutorial misconduct also ignores 
the fact that the prosecuting attorney, because she was a deputy 
county attorney, was without authorization to grant immunity to 
the co-defendant even if she was so inclined. State v. Ward, 571 
P.2d 1343 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 1005 (1978); Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-22-3 (1982). 
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co-defendant Palmer's handwriten notes made during the abduction, 
The record does not indicate from whom defendant secured the 
notes. The motion was denied (T. 347, 352-53). 
State v. Weaver, 6 P.2d 167; State v. Gehring, 694 P.2d 599. 
Similarly, it is axiomatic that "newly discovered evidence" 
justifying a new trial cannot be evidence known to defendant 
prior to trial. State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985). 
Evidence that is merely cumulative of defendant's testimony is 
not "new evidence". State v. Conrad, 590 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Utah 
1979). 
The evidence at trial clearly established that Mr. 
Taylor was forceably taken against his will and at the direction 
of defendant. (See Statement of Facts and Point II, Sufficiency 
of Evidence.) At best, Palmer's testimony would have 
corroborated defendant's claim that some time after being 
abducted Mr. Taylor appeared "perfectly happy" to be with 
defendant (R. 360-62). Defendant's claim that Palmer would have 
necessarily been a credible witness is speculative. At the time 
of trial, he was a co-defendant with charges pending, as such, 
his testimony could be viewed simply as self-serving. 
Under the facts of this case, the excluded testimony 
does not constitute "new evidence" nor is it "sufficiently 
persuasive that the result of the trial might be changed," State 
v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988). The trial court 
properly exercised its discretion in denying a new trial. State 
v. Smith, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 68. 
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conflicting evidence? or the crt
 a 
witnesses. That responsibility belongs 
strictly to the trier of fact. 'It is the 
exclusive function, of the jury to weigh the 
evidence and determine the credibility of the 
witnesses * . . . . So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, 
from which findings of all requisite elements 
of the crime can reasonably be made, [the 
court's] inquiry stops. 
III! il " " i j uo t i n g S t a t e v. Buukei , MJ'Ni III1 h\ 11| J", hl'i (Utah 
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the evidence . . . is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime. . . . 
State v. Harman# 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989) (citations 
omitted), quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
When the defense testimony presented merely differs from that of 
the prosecution and the prosecution's account of the facts does 
not appear to be so lacking and insubstantial that the jury must 
necessarily have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime charged, a reviewing court is 
obligated to assume the jury believed the evidence which supports 
the jury's verdict. State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 543 (Utah 
1981); State v. Smathers, 602 P.2d 708, 709 (Utah 1979). 
Defendant was charged with kidnapping in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (Supp. 1989). In accordance with the 
statutory language, jury instruction number five listed six 
elements which the jury was required to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt before finding the defendant guilty: (1) that the 
defendant, detained or restrained Mr. Taylor, (2) without 
authority of law, (3) against Mr. Taylor's will, (4) for a 
substantial period of time, (5) that the detention or restraint 
was done intentionally or knowingly, and (6) that the detention 
or restraint occurred on or about July 16, 1987 (R. 285). 
Defendant'8 challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence centers exclusively on the fourth element, whether Mr. 
Taylor was restrained for a substantial period of time (Br. App. 
17-18). Defendant's claim that Mr. Taylor was restrained Mfor 
brief seconds only" and that he immediately began to enjoy the 
company of his former wife is not supported by a fair reading of 
the record and completely ignores substantial compelling evidence 
to the contrary. 
In its case in chief, the prosecution elicited 
testimony from four witnesses other than the victim, Mr. Taylor, 
who each described Mr. Taylor's abduction. The testimony of each 
was consistent and unequivocal. Mr. Taylor fought and struggled 
but was forced into the waiting car (T. 32, 39, 41, 46, 58-59). 
Nadine Ashby testified that while Mr. Taylor was pleading for 
help he saw defendant and asked her "to help him, let him stay, 
he didn't want to go." (T. 219) Another witness testified that 
after being placed in the car, Mr. Taylor tried to escape but was 
pushed back inside (T. 51). Mr. Taylor's own testimony was that 
he fought and that he did not want to go with defendant (T. 111-
12, 135). Throughout the abduction, the two women who 
accompanied defendant held Nadine Ashby, John Taylor's seventy-
four year old sister, by pinning back her arms (T. 200, 216-17). 
Despite defendant's claims that the abduction was a 
"second honeymoon" (T. 400), credible evidence established that 
Mr. Taylor's experience had been very traumatic. The first 
indication came at defendant's attorney's office during Mr. 
Taylor's return on July 18. When Mr. Taylor was greeted by his 
attorney, Wayne Watson, with whom he had many dealings, Mr. 
Taylor did not recognize him (T. 295). 
Mr. Taylor was taken into protective custody and 
transported to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center for a physical 
examination (T. 69-71). The examination was conducted by Dr. 
Robert Day who had seen Mr. Taylor as recently as July 8, 1987 
and ten times since September 18, 1986 (T. 265, 276). 
Dr. Taylor's testimony was that there was "a 
significant decrease in his [Mr. Taylor's] mental capacity and 
his state of orientation since I had seen him before" (T. 268). 
Because Mr. Taylor did not recognize Dr. Day, could not give his 
location as being the hospital, and showed no short term memory, 
Dr. Day suspected drug intoxication (T. 268). It was during this 
examination that Dr. Day first observed signs of dementia (T. 
261). Blood samples revealed that valium or diazepam had been 
administered to Mr. Taylor although it had never been prescribed 
(T. 244-45, 265). The tests further revealed the drug had been 
administered only two to eight hours before the blood sample was 
drawn, approximately one hour after Mr. Taylor's release from 
defendant (T. 269). Although Mr. Taylor's confusion cleared 
somewhat by the time he was released from the hospital on July 
22, 1987 (T. 273), he never regained his former level of mental 
functioning (T. 272). 
Dr. Day attributed Mr. Taylor's condition to the stress 
of being taken from his usual environment, possible sleep 
deprivation during the abduction, fatigue from the trip to Denver 
and back, and the effect of injesting the sedative drug (T. 279). 
It was Dr. Day's conclusion that the two days with defendant had 
not been a pleasant experience for Mr. Taylor (T. 271). 
Testimony was also heard from Nadine Ashby, Mr. 
Taylor's sister, that Mr. Taylor's mental abilities were 
substantially impaired after the abduction; but, in the weeks 
that followed he showed signs of improvement (T. 74-75, 220). 
Clearly there is more than "some evidence" from which 
the jury could reasonably conclude that Mr. Taylor was restrained 
against his will for a substantial period of time. Simply 
because defendant offered a different version of the facts does 
not compel reversal. State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah 
1986). It is the responsibility of the jury to make 
determinations about the credibility of witnesses. State v. 
Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 27. A conviction will not be overturned 
merely because the jury chose to disbelieve the defendant. Ixi. at 
27-28. Simply put, a reviewing court will not substitute its 
judgment for that of the jury's as long as there is some evidence 
supporting all requisite elements of the crime. State v. Booker, 
709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985). When reviewing conflicting evidence, 
the Court is "obliged to accept the version of the facts which 
supports the verdict," State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah 
1982). 
The evidence that Mr. Taylor was detained against his 
will for a substantial period of time is compelling. With the 
added presumption in favor of the jury's findings, the evidence 
is more than sufficient for this Court to affirm the defendant's 
conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State 
respectfully requests that defendant's conviction be affirmed, 
DATED this *3/*>T<- day of July, 1989. 
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